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Abstract
Modern conflict is dominated by proxy wars but the United States
military fails to account for this type of environment. Instead, it speaks
euphemistically by using phrases like, By, With, and Through to
articulate the complexities of proxy environments. In doing so, it falls
short in understanding the dynamics at work between actors in a proxy
relationship, which has resulted in it doing poorly in modern proxy wars.
Therefore, the United States military should embrace proxy warfare from
a theoretical standpoint and develop a resultant proxy warfare doctrine.
Proxy environments - dominated by principal-agent problems, the
oppression of time, and power dynamics between actors - are often
paradoxical, but yield two distinct models, one that is exploitative and
the other being transactional. Breathing life into these theories of proxy
warfare adds to the professional body of knowledge and will assist
political and military leaders and advisers in proxy environments.
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Introduction 
 
Environments in which powers pursue its interests through surrogates 
dominate contemporary conflict. To be sure, the United States’ wars in the 
Middle East, The Philippines, and Africa through the 21st century 
illustrate this point. However, the idea of war-through-surrogate is not 
exclusive to the United States. Russia’s use of intermediaries in eastern 
Ukraine is a high-profile example of this concept in action. Delving beyond 
the surface, the student of war and international relations finds Iranian 
proxies interwoven in almost every political and military movement in the 
Middle East. 
 
That is not to say conventional conflict is over, or to argue that proxy wars 
are fundamentally guerrilla-driven insurgencies. To be sure, the 
conventional character and destruction of the campaigns to defeat the 
Islamic State, highlighted by the leveling of cities like Ramadi and Mosul 
in Iraq, Raqqa, and Aleppo in Syria, or Marawi in the Philippines, 
demonstrates that land armies are willing and able to stand and fight to 
further their military and political ends. Shifting to Ukraine’s Donets River 
Basin, one finds Russian proxies and regular forces meeting in battle in 
ways similar to those found in the Second World War. 
 
Understanding that proxy war is not unique to one method of warfighting, 
but instead possess its own nuance, it is instructive to note that the United 
States lacks a coherent theory of war or related doctrine to support proxy 
war. The United States Army, the service charged with leading the 
Department of Defense’s land wars, is all but absent any mention of proxy 
wars, proxies, or the use of intermediaries.1 Further, the American joint 
doctrine fails account for proxy war, as noted by the absence of any 
reference to proxy environments, proxy wars, or proxy forces within Joint 
Publication 3-0, Operations.2 This is problematic given the dominance of 
proxy wars in contemporary conflict. 
 
The United States Department of Defense sidesteps proxy reality and 
repackages the concept of operating through intermediaries in an idea 
known as by, with, and through and security force assistance. In addition 
to publishing a new security force assistance manual, United States Army 
General Joseph Votel, and United States Army Colonel Eero Keravuori, 
recently advocated that by, with, and through approach is the solution to 
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operating in environments in which the United States operates through 
surrogates.3 
 
Votel and Keravuori posit that United States Central Command’s ‘by, with, 
and through’  technique is useful in pursuing American interesting in 
Central Command’s area of responsibility and as a result, “The U.S. 
military must organize, resource, and train the joint force to operate by, 
with, and through with greater efficiency and effectiveness with various 
types of partners and whole-of-government involvement.”4 Further, they 
contend that the ‘by, with, and through’ approach will become increasingly 
useful on a global scale. Therefore, they recommend the adoption of a ‘by, 
with, and through’ approach as the standing operational approach and 
that the joint force develop an associated doctrine to support of this 
concept.5 
 
Votel and Keravuori’s argument is useful is starting the discussion 
environments in which a dominate partner works through an 
intermediary. It is useful because it reflects current narratives regarding 
proxy environments. Nevertheless, several problems exist with Votel and 
Keravuori’s advocacy for the ‘by, with, and through’ approach. First, they 
provide a solution without defining the problem they are attempting to 
solve. If one can make their way through euphemism of phrases like ‘by, 
with, and through’ and security force assistance, they will see that the 
problem is that of proxy environments, or environments in which one 
actor works with or through another actor to achieve its self-interest or 
national security objectives. 
 
Second, they suggest that the character of ‘by, with, and through’ is 
universal and should, therefore, serve as the foundation for a joint force 
doctrine when operating through intermediaries. Specifically, Votel and 
Keravuori state that, “To capitalize on this approach, the joint force must 
deliberately engage in developing doctrine for partnering, resourcing, 
organizing, educating, training, and transitioning in a ‘by, with, and 
through’ operational approach.”6 The problem with this argument is that it 
fails to address the uniqueness of proxy environments it relates to the 
relationship between partners. The argument also falls short because 
proxy environments have discrete nuance and therefore are not 
universally transferable. To be sure, Central Command’s proxy situation is 
not the same as those found in other theaters. U.S. European Command, 
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 12, No. 1
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol12/iss1/3
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.12.1.1701
46 
 
U.S. Africa Command, and U.S. Indo-Pacific Command are addressing 
proxy conflicts that are distinct from those facing U.S. Central Command. 
As a result, a Central Command-specific approach, such as by, with, and 
through, are illogical. Further, operating through intermediaries is not 
unique to the American perspective, and an approach that focuses on 
American predilections at the expense of proxy truths, is short-sided and 
results in environment blind spots. 
 
Third, the ‘by, with, and through’ approach has not provided tangible 
victory beyond the tactical level. While the United States and the Iraqi 
Security Forces were able to defeat the Islamic State in Iraq physically, 
strategic and political victory slipped away during the summer of 2018. 
Furthermore, none of the United States military’s recent or on-going proxy 
conflicts, such as Operation Iraqi Freedom or Operation Enduring 
Freedom, has concluded on terms favorable to the United States. 
 
The thrust of this work is to clarify the problems found within Votel and 
Keravuori’s argument. In doing so, this essay looks to push beyond 
euphemistic and misleading phraseology and instead speak plainly about 
proxy warfare. When framing the proxy conflict, the illumination of three 
distinct features is apparent. The first feature that dominates proxy 
conflicts is that of principal-agent problems. Second is the role of power in 
proxy relationships. The third and final feature is the dominant role of 
time in proxy conflict. These features drive two distinct models of proxy 
environments – a transactional and exploitative model. This essay then 
concludes by providing a set of principles, deduced from the 
aforementioned analysis, to set the foundation for a general theory of 
proxy warfare. This general theory of proxy warfare should serve as the 
basis for a proxy warfare doctrine. 
 
A Deeper Examination of the Problems with the By, With, and 
Through Approach 
 
The first problem with the ‘by, with, and through’ approach articulated by 
Votel and Keravouri is that it is a solution looking for a problem. The 
closest Votel and Keravouri come to stating a problem is in suggesting 
that, “Regional conflicts can arise when...actors do not have the capacity 
and resources to resolve their conflicts locally, potentially putting U.S. 
interests in the region at risk.”7 This statement, and the remainder of their 
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argument, provides almost no context to support their argument for why 
the BWT approach. This begs the question, what is the problem Central 
Command is attempting to solve? 
 
The military problems plaguing Central Command are manifold. From 
countering the Islamic State across the area of responsibility to keeping 
the Taliban at bay in Afghanistan, the problems span the geographic 
expanse of the area of responsibility. The United States Government and 
Department of Defense, in most cases, have resolved to face those 
challenges through a limited liability approach, meaning that instead of 
putting United States military personnel at the front of these fights, they 
elect to operate through proxies. In addition, this—proxy environments 
and proxy warfare—is the problem not articulated in Votel and Keravuori’s 
argument. While course and distasteful, it is worth being forthright about 
those concepts because they dominate contemporary war and are at the 
heart of what ‘by, with, and through’ attempts to address. 
 
American strategic theorist, Everett Dolman, contends that if one only 
communicates in the language of the system they inextricably bound by 
that system’s rules.8 In the case of the United States military, being 
unwilling to speak openly about proxy environments and proxy warfare, 
and instead speaking through its approved euphemisms, has created a 
situation in which the United States military has no unifying theory or 
doctrine for the environment in which it most often finds itself. Similarly, 
a recent report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, in 
which they state that, “The United States lacks a common government-
wide policy or doctrinal definition for characterizing different security 
partnerships in implementing a “by, with, and through” approach.”9 But 
again, the manner in which the United States military speaks about proxy 
warfare, using phrases such as security force assistance, working through 
partners, and working by, with, and through, is good for softening the 
coarseness of proxy warfare’s reality, but it does little to illuminate the 
concept. 
 
Additionally, the ‘by, with, and through’ approach fails to advance a war-
winning technique. While definitions of victory are dubious, British 
military theorist, B. H. Liddell Hart offers that, “The object in war is to 
attain a better peace—even if only from your own point of view. Hence it is 
essential to conduct war with constant regard to the peace you desire.”10 
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Prussian general and military theorist Colmar von der Goltz reinforces this 
position in writing that, “After shattering the hostile main army, we, 
therefore, still have the coercion of a peace as a special, and, under certain 
more circumstances, more difficult, task to consider, the solution of which 
should, however, have been carefully weighed before deciding upon war.”11 
Goltz reminds the practitioner of war that tactical victory, such as 
Operation Inherent Resolve’s battle of Mosul, are hollow victories if we fail 
to secure the peace or if we fail to link the those tactical victories to the 
maintenance of our strategic objectives. Moreover, in the case of proxy 
environments, the pursuit of one’s strategic ends has to be sensitive and 
responsive to both oneself, and to the proxy force’s government, especially 
in transactional relationships. 
 
To be sure, the Votel and Kervouri provide ample tactical examples that 
illustrate the utility of the ‘by, with, and through’ approach allowing the 
United States military to operate through and alongside proxies, but to 
date, the concept has failed to deliver tangible victory—a better peace—at 
the operational or strategic level.12 Of its recent proxy campaigns, 
Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Inherent Resolve in Iraq, have 
terminated; however, strategic victory slipped away following each 
operation due to the inability to effective manipulate the proxy 
environment.  
 
Defining the Shape of Proxy Environments and Proxy 
Relationships 
 
If one accepts that ‘by, with, and through’ is just a euphemism for proxy 
warfare, which forms the basis of this essay’s argument, then it naturally 
follows that proxy environments must be explained in detail. In order to 
comprehend proxy environments, it is imperative to understand that 
Central Command’s version of proxy warfare is not universal, nor is proxy 
warfare something uniquely American. Therefore, it follows that proxy 
warfare is: 
 
a) A form of warfare that possesses nuance 
b) That its nuance is relative to the geographic theater  
c) That its nuance is relative to the principal force in the proxy 
relationship  
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d) That its nuance is relative to the proxy, or agent, in the proxy 
relationship.13  
 
Before moving on it is important to highlight a few other points and to 
offer a definition of proxy environments and proxy warfare. First, varying 
degrees of proxy warfare exist.14 This is a valid argument; however, as will 
be described later, this can be better understood with two models of proxy 
warfare. Second, proxy warfare and coalition warfare share similar 
characteristics, if not overlap a bit, especially as one moves away from the 
exploitative end of the proxy warfare spectrum. This is where a definition 
for the concepts becomes useful.  
 
For the purpose of this essay, a proxy environment is defined as an 
environment characterized by two or more actors working towards a 
common objective; the relationship between the two actors is hierarchical 
and the principal actor is working by, with, and through another actor (an 
agent, or proxy) to accomplish its objective. By default, the principal’s 
objective becomes the agent’s objective. Proxy warfare, on the other hand, 
is the associated theory of action for proxy environments. Proxy warfare is 
the physical manifestation of a dominant actor, or the principal, operating 
by, with, and through a non-dominant actor (the agent, or proxy) against 
an adversary to achieve the dominant actors’ military objectives.  
 
Relationships between parties are either tight or loosely-coupled. The 
relationship’s tight or loose-coupling results from its environmental and 
internal conditions. A tight-coupled relationship is one in which both 
parties have many variables in common or the variables they have in 
common are strong. In tight-coupled relationships bond between actors is 
strong and the non-dominant actor is highly responsive to the dominant 
actor. Conversely, in loose-coupled relationships the bond is weak because 
either the actors have few variables in common or those that are in 
common and are weakly aligned.15 A quick scan of a few current proxy 
environment demonstrates this supposition.16  
 
Russia has long been one of the leaders of proxy warfare. British military 
historian John Keegan notes that the Romanov dynasty, which ruled 
Russia from the seventeenth century until the Russian Revolution of 1917, 
recurrently solicited the Cossacks to serve as its proxy and to augment its 
own combat power.17 Similarly, Russia dominates modern proxy hotspots 
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by achieving access and influence with pliable local nationals, mercenaries, 
and foreign nationals sympathetic to its cause. Various forms of Russian 
proxies exist throughout Eastern Europe and the Caucasus region, but two 
of the most interesting examples of Russian proxies endure in the ongoing 
conflicts in Ukraine’s Donets Basin and in Syria.18  
 
In Ukraine’s Donets Basin, Russian proxies have been doing Russian 
bidding since the spring of 2014. The proxies, manifest as Russian-aligned 
Ukrainian separatists, carved out a foothold in eastern Ukraine, and have 
maintained quasi-independence from the government in Kyiv courtesy of 
Moscow’s support. While direct Russian military involvement in the 
conflict is well known, recent reports suggest that Russian generals are at 
the top of its proxy army.19 Along the way, Russian forces, both proxy and 
its own military, have killed over 10,000 Ukrainians in the Donets Basin 
and wounded an additional 24,000.20  
 
In Syria, Russia has a friend in President Bashar Al-Assad. Russia, to 
bolster Assad, leverages Syrian proxies, private military companies, and 
Chechen client forces, in coordination with its own armed forces. Further, 
Russia practices strategic and operational ju-jitsu by using the Syrian civil 
war and the mission to defeat the Islamic State in the Levant against the 
involved parties, while offering to mediate the chaos they create. General 
Votel has spoken about Russia’s approach, stating that in Syria and the 
Central Command area of responsibility, Russia plays both the arsonist 
and the fireman.21  
 
As mentioned previously, the U.S. military makes frequent use of proxy 
forces. See Table 1. Operation Inherent Resolve is perhaps the most 
obvious example of American proxy warfare in which United States forces, 
in conjunction with coalition members, fought through Iraqi and Kurdish 
intermediaries to defeat the Islamic State in Iraq militarily. Currently, 
United States forces are still working to do the same in Syria, albeit with a 
different proxy force.  
 
Operation Inherent Resolve is not the only example of American forces 
engaged in proxy environments. The United States employed proxies to 
defeat the Islamic State in The Philippines militarily, as the battle of 
Marawi illustrates.22 In Saudi Arabia, American forces are working 
through proxies to assisting the Saudis against the Houthi rebels.23 
Fox: Conflict and the Need for a Theory of Proxy Warfare
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2019
51 
 
Afghanistan, the United States Army’s longest running proxy hotspot, has 
seen both direct combat and war through proxy since 2001. Most recently, 
the United States Army deployed its first security forces assistance brigade 
to spearhead its proxy war against the Taliban and other enemies in the 
region. Meanwhile, in Africa, the United States reportedly has over 5,000 
soldiers leveraging local proxies to counter Islamic State expansion on the 
continent.24    
 
Table 1: Known United States Proxy Wars, 2001-Present 
Principal Proxy Conflict Theater Date 
United 
States 
Afghan 
Defense 
Forces 
Operation 
Enduring 
Freedom / 
Resolute 
Support 
Afghanistan October 
2001-
present 
United 
States 
Iraqi 
Security 
Forces 
Operation 
Iraqi 
Freedom / 
New Dawn 
Iraq March 
2003-
December 
2011 
United 
States 
Iraqi 
Security 
Forces 
Operation 
Inherent 
Resolve 
Iraq October 
2014-May 
2018 
United 
States 
Syrian 
Democratic 
Forces 
Operation 
Inherent 
Resolve 
Syria October 
2014-
present 
United 
States 
Filipino 
Defense 
Forces 
Counter-
Islamic 
State 
Campaign 
The 
Philippines 
Fall 2016-
present 
United 
States 
Saudi 
Arabian 
Defense 
Forces 
Operation 
Yukon 
Journey 
Saudi Arabia, 
Yemen 
Unknown-
present 
United 
States 
Multiple 
African 
defense 
forces 
Counter 
Islamic 
State 
Campaign 
Africa Unknown-
present 
Note: The researcher reviewed all data listed in this table. All sources are 
found in the footnotes and come from open-source information sources. 
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Source: Author.  
 
Given the diversity of proxy environments, developing a general theory of 
proxy environments logically follows. This theory must then form the basis 
for a doctrine for proxy warfare. Both the theory of proxy environments 
and doctrine of proxy warfare must be rooted current and historic 
examples, such as those from the preceding paragraphs. Further, the 
theory and doctrine cannot gravitate around an American-centric point of 
view, but rather, from a position that explains the uncolored character of 
each.  
 
With that in mind and given the cursory discussion on proxy 
environments in the previous paragraphs, a handful of axioms on proxy 
environments illuminate themselves. At the most rudimentary level, the 
following tenets bound proxy environments: 
 
● All proxy environments are driven by political interest; this 
forms the basis for military partnership and aligned military 
objectives; 
● Proxy environments are based on a relationship between a 
principal and a proxy, or agent; 
● Proxy relationships are transactional or exploitative; 
● Proxy relationships, being either transaction or exploitative, 
have a limited duration; 
● Not all political, strategic, and operational decisions come with a 
noticeable or overt change at the tactical level; 
● Battles won accelerates divergence, while battles lost weaken the 
principal-agent relationship;  
● Proxy hot spots are not unique to one type of warfare, but exist 
anywhere along the war’s continuum;  
● The base of power within a proxy (principal-agent) relationship 
can shift if:  
o The proxy grows strong enough stand on its own, 
o The proxy gains or mobilizes power from actors that are 
not the principal partner, 
o The proxy accomplished the goals that brought it in line 
with the principal  
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These axioms, or bookends to proxy environments, provide a point of 
departure in which to extrapolate a theory of proxy environments further.  
 
Expanding Existing Models: The Components of Proxy 
Environments 
 
British historian, theorist, and soldier, J.F.C. Fuller offers astute advice in 
the argument for rigor in developing doctrine. Fuller posits that, “Method 
creates doctrine, and a common doctrine is the cement which holds an 
army together. Though mud is better than no cement, we want the best 
cement, and we shall never get it unless we can analyze war scientifically 
and discover its values.”25 With that point in mind, the following section 
seeks to develop the ‘science,’ or theoretical underpinning, that Fuller 
suggests is so important to developing a solid doctrine. This section, which 
builds upon the previous noted axioms, seeks to build a general theory of 
proxy environments through exposing the components of proxy 
environments—the impact of time, fallacy of limited liability, and the 
principal-agent problem.  
 
Time: The Governing Condition of War 
 
Given proxy warfare’s character, driven by shifting political winds; it is fair 
to argue that a running clock dominates proxy environments. American 
military theorist, Robert Leonhard, argues that the inability to manipulate 
time effectively, above all else, is what most plagues commanders.26 More 
to the point, Leonhard asserts that, “Military conflict—whether in wars, 
campaigns, or battles—seeks to summon that failure (or delay it) and is 
therefore, when reduced to its fundamentals, a contest for time.”27 Perhaps 
more appropriately, J.F.C. Fuller contends that, “Superiority of time is so 
important a factor in war that it frequently becomes the governing 
condition.”28 Time, being a salient component of proxy warfare, warrants 
further analysis.  
 
Time operates at varying rates across the levels of war, as well as across 
the social and political spectrum. Furthermore, time varies based upon a 
society’s level of involvement in a specified conflict. For instance, the Iraqi 
social and political clock, as it related to the defeat of the Islamic State, 
moved much quicker than did the social and political clock in the United 
States. As a result, Iraqi Prime Minister Abadi was quick to declare victory 
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over the Islamic State and shifted his messaging to U.S. troop reductions 
following his pronouncement of victory in December 2017.29 
 
Further, social, and political clocks operate quicker than does a military’s 
clock. Military commanders tend to press for more time, while societies 
and political leaders urge the military to conclude military activity, as 
recent U.S. political-military discussions on Syria illustrate.30 In proxy 
environments, military commanders need to appreciate that they must 
balance the time on all these clocks.  
 
More importantly, leaders in proxy environments must focus on the the 
social and political appetites of their proxy because as Thucydides reminds 
the student of war, actors wage war out of fear, honor, or self-interest.31 
When the proxy aligned with the principal—because its interests have 
shifted, it no longer feels threatened or dishonored to the degree that its 
needs external support—it will seek to distance itself from the principal. 
However, failure to see that and accept that these relationships, by their 
transactional or exploitative character, have a finite duration can result in 
the principal-agent relationship turning foul. See Figure 1, Time’s Effect on 
Proxy Relationships. The May 2018 national elections in Iraq provide an 
instructive example of this argument.   
 
Figure 1: Time's Effect on Proxy Relationships  
 
Source: Author. 
 
The success of Shia nationalist, Muqtada al-Sadr, at the expense of Prime 
Minister Abadi, in Iraq’s 2018 parliamentary elections is perhaps 
representative of the role time plays in proxy environments. Prior to the 
Fox: Conflict and the Need for a Theory of Proxy Warfare
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2019
55 
 
election Abadi led the defeat of the Islamic State, stymied Kurdish 
independence, and held the country together when it was teetering on 
collapse. However, Abadi and his government were unable to force the 
United States to reduce its presence in the country following that series of 
success. Causality being difficult to discern, the Iraqi electorate turned out 
to support Sadr’s pro-Iraqi, Shia nationalist platform in the election, 
resulting with Abadi and his bloc coming in third place.32 The strategic 
effect of the election is still unclear, but it is decidedly easy to forecast a 
dramatic change in the relationship between the two countries.33 
 
The Limited Liability Fallacy and the Increasing Use of the 
Siege 
 
Another misconception about proxy warfare is that it is an economy of 
force mission that results in a limited liability approach to warfare. Votel 
and Keravouri articulate as much in stating, “By, with, and through is a 
way of conducting military activities and operations with less direct 
combat employment of U.S. forces.”34 While the economy of force is true 
to varying degrees, the limited liability aspect is short-sided and 
disingenuous.  
 
Modern proxy conflict is dominated by death and destruction; however, it 
just so happens that the death and destruction affect the proxy to almost 
an equal degree as that of the enemy. More to the point, in recent year’s 
proxy warfare has resulted a drastic increase in the number, duration, and 
lethality of sieges across the globe.35 Sieges, like those in Mosul and 
Marawi, from an American perspective, or Donetsk airport and 
Debal’tseve from a Russian perspective, illustrate the close bond between 
fighting through proxies and the increased risk for the principal’s proxy. 
The resultant effect is that the character of proxy warfare increases the 
cost and risk for the proxy force and its government, therefore creating the 
conditions that can accelerate divergence in the relationship between the 
partners. 
 
 
 
The Principal-Agent Problem: The Root of Transactional and 
Exploitative Relationships 
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The principal-agent problem is essential in proxy environments. 
Organizational theorist, Kathleen Eisenhardt, argues that principal-agent 
problems arise in situations “In which one party (the principal) delegates 
work to another (the agent) who performs that work.”36 Further, 
Eisenhardt states that two primary problems arise in this dynamic – 1) the 
problem of agency and 2) the problem of risk sharing.37 Eisenhardt defines 
the agency problem as a situation that occurs when, “The desires or goals 
of the principal and agent conflict,” while she defines the problem of risk 
sharing as a situation that arises when the principal and agent possess 
dissimilar prerogatives towards risk, resulting in divergent action as 
contact with risk continues.38 However, the problem of agency and risk 
sharing is not new. Prussian theorist Carl von Clausewitz highlighted this 
concept two hundred years ago in writing that, “One country may support 
another’s cause, but will never take it as serious as it takes its own.”39  
 
The American military tends to see the proxy, or agent, possessing 
limitless will to work with its forces. In most cases, it fails to see that 
cooperation is fleeting because as the agent becomes more capable or as 
other actors are able to identify vulnerabilities and manipulate those to 
their own end, the agent becomes gradually less interested in working with 
the principal. To put it differently, as time progresses and objectives are 
accomplished, each parties’ self-interest begins to supplant the objectives 
and end states that brought the principal and agent together in the first 
place. See Figure 2, Principal-Agent Problem. Operation Inherent Resolve 
provides an instructive model in support of the principal-agent problem. 
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Figure 2: Principal-Agent Problems 
 
Source: Author 
 
Following Operation Inherent Resolve’s devastating battle of Mosul, a 
several tactical objectives remained. These objectives included defeating 
residual Islamic State forces in Tal A’far, Hawijah, and along Iraq’s 
Euphrates River Valley, from Fallujah to the Syrian border.40 Given the 
2,000 Islamic State fighters estimated to be in Tal A’far, the battle of 
Mosul’s savagery and devastation served as the template for the remaining 
battles.41   
 
The Iraqi Security Forces (the agent) and the American-led coalition (the 
principal) commenced hostilities against the Islamic State in Tal A’far on 
August 19, 2017, but Islamic State resistance did not fully materialize and 
the battle ended within eight days.42 Casualties on both sides were 
relatively low, especially when contrasted with those from Mosul. Prime 
Minister Abadi, as well as many leaders within the Iraqi Security Forces, 
appeared to have taken two major points from this time. First, the battle of 
Mosul had a decisive effect on the Islamic State. The organization’s 
military wing within Iraq was physically defeated, leaving little force for 
the Islamic State’s political wing to continue large-scale combat 
operations.  
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Two, Mosul had hardened the Iraqi Security Forces and increased its 
steadfastness. These two effects resulted in the government of Iraq and the 
Iraqi Security Forces (the agent) losing interest in maintaining pressure on 
the Islamic State. In effect, the success of Mosul and Tal A’Far accelerated 
the divergence between raison d’être and the agent’s self-interest. 
 
With the threat of the Islamic State marginalized, and the Iraqi Security 
Forces self-confident, the government of Iraq reoriented on the Kurds. In 
September 2017, Iraqi Kurdistan, led by Marzoud Barzani, voted for 
independence from Iraq. Prime Minister Abadi, unwilling to accept 
Kurdish independence, launched an offensive in mid-October 2017 to 
thwart the movement.43 Sidestepping his coalition partners, Abadi’s 
Kurdish operation was unilateral and a clear signal of divergence between 
the principal and the agent in Iraq. 
 
In Syria, another example of the principal-agent problem exists, although 
this one finds the United States as the principal and the Kurdish-
dominated Syrian Democratic Forces as the agent. Turkey, upset with 
growing Kurdish strength in Syria, accelerated pressure on the Syrian 
Kurds by attacking Kurdish territory along the Turkey-Syria border. This 
weakened the strategic bond between the principal (the United States) and 
the agent (the Syrian Democratic Forces) because the risk to the Kurdish 
people in northern Syria and the loss of their traditional territory was of 
higher concern to the Syrian Kurds than maintaining pressure on the 
Islamic State in Syria’s eastern desert. As a result, the Syrian Democratic 
Forces temporarily broke contact with the American-led coalition to 
defend its people and territory in Afrin and other areas of northern Syria, 
which drove a two-month operational pause in the counter-Islamic State 
mission in Syria during the spring of 2018.44 A similar situation occurred 
in the fall of 2018, resulting in another operational pause in the campaign 
to defeat the Islamic State in Syria.45  
 
Operation Inherent Resolve provides two examples of the principal-agent 
problem, but the problem exists anywhere proxy warfare is conducted. As 
long as one actor seeks to work through another actor, problems of agency 
and risk will always exist. The components of proxy environments 
described above form the basis for understanding two theoretical models 
of proxy warfare: The Exploitative Model and the Transactional Model.                
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The Role of Power in Proxy Warfare 
 
Power—its principles, components, and influence—lies just below time 
and principal-agent problems in understanding proxy warfare. Historian 
Sir Michael Howard offers that, “Power, to the statesman, is…that capacity 
to control their environment on which the independent existence of their 
states and often the cultural values of their societies depend.”46 Moving to 
a more practical level, political scientist Robert Dahl, provides a useful 
model for understanding the discreteness of power.  
 
Robert Dahl argues that power exists in a relationship between two or 
more actors; that, “A has power over B to the extent the he can get B to do 
something that B would not otherwise do.”47 Dahl continues, stating that 
power is not self-perpetuating, but that in most cases it has a base. The 
base of power consists of all the resources from which an actor draws to 
affect the behavior of another actor. Dahl posits that the base of power is a 
similar to potential energy in that it requires activation to generate its 
desired effect. Dahl states thatto manipulatingone’s base of power 
effectively is the primary means for maintaining power over another 
actor.48 Dahl notes that a delay exists between A’s exertion of power and 
B’s ability to react. This delay, which Dahl refers to as “lag,” represents the 
processing and action time associated with A’s power and B’s ability and 
willingness to be overpowered.49 Lag influences proxy environments 
because if often hides or distorts an actor’s true intention. This creates 
dissonance for actors, across the levels of war, as they attempt to maintain 
power and influence within their relationship. See Figure 3: Graphical 
Representation of Lag. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Graphical Representation of Lag 
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Source: Author 
 
Equally important, Dahl argues that a relationship between two actors 
must exist, otherwise there is no vehicle to enact power.50 See Figure 4: 
Wave of Influence in Proxy Relationships.  
 
Figure 4: Wave of Influence in Proxy Relationships 
 
Source: Author 
 
These relationships are not static but morph as conditions change, time 
passes, and other actors enter or depart a given situation. This idea, that 
associations change, thus increasing or decreasing one’s relative power, is 
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a central tenet in proxy warfare. However, this idea is often overlooked in 
applied relationships—when A, guided by its own interests, attempts to 
maintain power and influence over B—like those found in proxy wars. See 
Figure 5: Wave of Influence in Adversarial Context. 
 
Figure 5: Wave of Influence in an Adversarial Context 
 
Source: Author 
 
Tying Dahl’s theory of power to the principal-agent problem, one can 
argue that Dahl’s A equates to the principal, while B is the agent. 
Therefore, the principal possesses power of the proxy, or agent, insofar as 
it can make it do something it would not otherwise do. Dahl’s principles of 
power forms the basis for understanding two theoretical models of proxy 
warfare—the Exploitative Model and the Transactional Model. 
 
 
 
 
Theories of Proxy Warfare 
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Theories serve to set the course for doctrine. Harkening back to 
Clausewitz, we find that,  
 
The primary purpose of any theory is to clarify concepts and ideas 
that have become, as it were, confused and entangled. Not until 
terms and concepts have been defined can one hope to make any 
progress in examining the question clearly and simply and expect 
the read to share one’s view.51  
 
In the spirit of Clausewitz’s musing, and viewed in relation to components 
of proxy environments depicted above, two models of proxy warfare come 
to the fore. These models represent the idea of ‘varying degrees of proxy 
warfare’ in a tangible way that makes the idea useful for the practitioner of 
war.   
 
The Exploitative Model: Principal Leads, Agent Follows 
 
Two similar, yet distinct models characterize proxy environments: The 
Exploitative Model and the Transactional Model. From the outside, these 
models look quite similar, but their inner-workings differ. A proxy force 
being completely dependent on its principal for survival characterizes the 
Exploitative Model; the relationship could almost be viewed as one 
between a parasite and a host. The principal provides the lifeblood for the 
parasitic proxy to survive. This dependency creates a strong bond between 
the proxy and the partner, resulting in the partner possessing almost 
unlimited power and influence over the proxy. 
 
Further, the Exploitative Model is usually the result of a stronger actor 
looking for a tool—a proxy force—to pursue an objective. As a result, the 
proxy is only as useful to the principal as is its ability to make progress 
towards the principal’s ends. This results in a temporal relationship 
between the principal and the agent. Once the principal’s ends have been 
achieved, or the proxy is unable to maintain momentum towards the 
principal’s ends then the principal discontinues the relationship or 
distances itself from the proxy. See Figure 6, The Exploitative Model of 
Proxy Warfare.  
 
Figure 6: The Exploitative Model of Proxy Warfare 
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Source: Author 
 
Europe provides one of the best contemporary examples of this model, 
embodied in the relationship between Russia and the separatists in 
Ukraine’s Donbas region. The existence of the Russian-leaning separatists, 
the funding and materiel backing of its army, and its pseudo-political 
status are all Russian foundations.  
 
The Middle East also provides several examples of the Exploitative Model. 
Perhaps the two most noticeable examples are the U.S. military’s ongoing 
relationship with the Syrian Democratic Forces and the Iraqi Security 
Forces throughout Operation Iraqi Freedom. The Syrian Democratic 
Forces are a creation of the United States military and their status as an 
American partner will likely only last as long as they are able to maintain 
pressure on the Islamic State in Syria. Similarly, the Iraqi Security Forces, 
rebuilt from the ashes of Saddam Hussein’s army after Paul Bremer’s 
dismissal of the Iraqi Army in May 2003, was the United States’ 
intermediary in combating al Qaeda, Shia militia groups, Iranian proxies, 
and other adversaries in Iraq until policy changes formally ended the 
principal-agent relationship in December 2011.     
 
In each case, the agent is vitally dependent on its principal. However, 
success can cause the power relationship to change between the partners. 
A successful proxy force can generate enough legitimacy or support that it 
grows powerful enough to need backing from its partner. Similarly, the 
political apparatus the proxy supports can gain sufficient power and 
legitimacy that it elects to no longer serve as an agent, as the Iraqi Security 
Forces’ independence following the United States’ departure in December 
2011 highlights. See Figure 7, Proxy Success and the Evolution of 
Partnered Relationships. If, through battlefield success, political 
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wrangling, or other actors seeking to undermine the existing principal, the 
proxy can also find itself in the second model, the Transactional Model.      
 
Figure 7: Proxy Success and the Evolution of Partnered 
Relationships 
 
Source: Author 
 
The Transactional Model: Agent Leads, Principal Follows 
 
The Transactional Model is proxy warfare’s second model. Again, 
Clausewitz provides the foundation for understanding this model, as he 
writes, “But even when both states are in earnest about making war upon 
the third, they do not always say, “we must treat this country as our 
common enemy and destroy it, or we shall be destroyed ourselves.” Far 
from it: The affair is more often like a business deal.”52 The point being 
that an exchange of services and goods that benefits all parties—defeat of a 
mutual threat, training of the agent’s force, foreign military sales and 
finance—is at the heart of the Transactional Model. See Figure 8, The 
Transactional Model of Proxy Warfare. 
 
Figure 8: The Transactional Model of Proxy Warfare 
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Source: Author 
 
Yet, this model is a paradox because the proxy is the powerbroker in the 
relationship. In many cases, the proxy government is independent but 
looking for assistance in defeating an adversary; it is not interested in 
political or military subjugation by the principal. Moreover, the proxy 
possesses the power in the relationship because its association with the 
principal is wholly transactional. Given the transactional character of the 
relationship, the clock starts ticking on the duration of the bond when the 
first shot fired. . As a result, the agent’s interest in the principal recedes at 
a comparable rate to the attainment of the two actors’ common goal. The 
government of Iraq’s 2014 request for American and coalition assistance 
to defeat the Islamic State in Iraq is an example of this dynamic. 
 
A mental picture to support this model is to view the proxy in the lead, 
while the partner follows and supports the proxy. Unlike the Exploitative 
Model, this model sees the proxy force’s government request support from 
other nation(s) to defeat a given threat. In doing so, the proxy force’s 
government places parameters on the partner, to include such things as 
force caps, a unambiguous mission, and time lines. The proxy issues 
parameters to align the principal with its own political and military 
objectives. Additionally, the proxy constrains the principal in order to limit 
the ability to influence the proxy beyond the defined parameters of the 
affiliation. It is also important to note the fact that the proxy has fixed 
political and social interest in the principal; it is likely that the proxy will 
look to end its dependency on the principal upon the attainment of its 
goals. 
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At the same time, the Transactional Model is extremely vulnerable to 
external influence. The Transactional Model is vulnerable because the 
proxy’s commitment to the principal is based self-interest more than 
survival, meaning it can divorce itself from the principal whenever it no 
longer profits from the relationship. This provides advantage for adroit 
actors seeking to drive a wedge into a principal-agent relationship. Russia 
and China’s activity in Iraq provides an instructive example of this 
dynamic. See Figure 6, Wave of Influence in an Adversarial Context. 
Seeking to weaken the America-Iraqi bond, both have managed to wedge 
themselves into the foreign military sales and foreign military finance 
realm, which was the bulwark of American political and military strategy 
in Iraq.53 In doing so, both Russia and China have managed to gain 
strategic access, influence, and tactical in-roads across the country. 
Similarly, clever external actors will undercut the principal by providing 
support with fewer caveats on the support they provide the agent in order 
to exploit gaps in the principal’s policy and relationship strategy, and thus 
cleave away the principal.   
 
It is critical to understand the model in which one is operating. Hubris, 
inattentiveness, or naivety in the Transactional Model can result in the 
decoupling of the principal and the agent. An assessments program and an 
exit plan are important when operating within the Transactional Model. 
The assessments program allows the principal to see itself in relation to its 
agent and determine where it sits in relation to the culmination point of its 
relationship with the agent. The exit plan is simply that – the plan to 
conclude the relationship and move forward on favorable terms. Failure to 
have an assessment program and exit plan can result in the agent bilking 
the principal, or the principal ruining the long-term political relationship 
between the two. This exploitation can come in the form of requests for 
monetary assistance, feigning bureaucratic incompetence to outsource its 
bureaucratic requirements to the principal, and a number of other ways. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The point of this essay has been to provide a professional critique against 
the argument for the utility of the ‘by, with, and through’ approach. This 
essay has argued that the ‘by, with, and through’ approach has yielded 
limited tactical and operational success, but it has not generated tangible 
strategic victory in any of the recent conflicts. Further, and more 
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importantly, the ‘by, with, and through’ approach is a euphemism for 
proxy warfare. By speaking euphemistically about proxy environments, the 
United States military undercuts its own understanding of how to succeed 
in those environments. As such, the United States military and the defense 
industry must change its attitude towards proxy warfare and speak openly 
about those types of conflict. Doing so will generate improved results as 
leaders at all levels better understand the linkage between tactical action 
and political objectives, but also, the paradoxes that dominate proxy 
environments.   
 
Moreover, commonalities dominate proxy environments. These 
commonalities enable the student of war to frame proxy environments. 
These commonalities result in a series of axioms that bracket proxy 
warfare. Principal-agent problems, the limited liability fallacy, and the 
domineering character of time command proxy environments. These 
characteristics result in two models of proxy warfare, the Exploitative 
Model and the Transactional Model. These models yield a handful of 
principles of proxy warfare, which viewed in conjunction with the models 
of proxy warfare, should serve as the basis for a proxy warfare doctrine.  
 
A number of proxy warfare principles emerge from the discussion thus far. 
These principles, while not all-inclusive, should serve as the starting point 
for articulating a universal proxy warfare doctrine. The proposed 
principles of proxy warfare are: 
 
• Principals, agents, and actors will act in a manner aligned with their 
respective political objectives; 
• Proxy relationships will expire; therefore, it is important to identify 
one’s own termination criteria and transition plan; 
• Because of the lag between the tactical level and higher echelons, 
one should take tactical feedback as not wholly representative of 
operational, strategic, and political direction;  
• A principal’s continued presence beyond the end of the principal-
agent relationship can cause the agent’s political, social, and 
military entities to turn against its former partner; 
• It is better to face one opponent than it is two; therefore, opponents 
will attempt to dislocate principal-agent relationships; 
• Savvy opponents will seek to fracture the principal-agent alliance 
by: 
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o attacking the relationships bonding or  
o introducing existential threats that challenge that livelihood 
of one the partners   
• Due to the lag in tactical feedback, red teaming and assessments are 
critical to monitoring a principal-agent dynamic.54 
 
These principles, plus the Exploitative and Transactional Models of proxy 
warfare, provides a starting point for t to begin constructing a 
comprehensive proxy warfare doctrine. This approach, embracing proxy 
warfare, and moving beyond modern narratives, like that of the ‘by, with, 
and through’ approach are warranted given the lack of qualitative and 
quantitative results in the United States’ recent proxy wars. 
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